98 COMPETITION LAW IN TOURISM In this respect, at least a few examples of the abuse of dominance of businesses having a powerful market position can be mentioned here. Thus, it could happen that some of them would like to exploit their excessive market power unlawfully in order to impose adverse conditions on their subcontractors, stimulate prices in themarket or get competitors out of themarket. In such situations, competition in the relevant market can be disturbed and competitors and consumers can both suffer the consequences of illicit practices. Moreover, the suspected occurrence of the above practices may inspire competition authorities to initiate antimonopoly proceedings, administrative sanctions and in some cases, criminal sanctions. The aforementioned are, however, not all the consequences that the perpetrator can experience as a result of its anticompetitive behaviour. In a nutshell, the intervention of public authorities primarily aims at regaining the competitive and economic balance in themarket disturbed by anticompetitive practices. In the long run, this means deterring potential violators from further infringements of antitrust law. There has been ongoing discussion on the goals and efficacy of public antitrust policy, engaging scholars, practicing lawyers, various institutions and politicians, without an end to these discussions in sight28. One thing seems to be certain, however: the party that suffered damage resulting from a violation of competition law (the damaged party), whether consumer or business, is not compensated as a consequence of public intervention undertaken by a competition authority, at least not in the short term. This means that the damaged party does not benefit directly from the result of such public proceedings, despite the fact that its situation in the market can improve in the long run. The preceding conclusion is not certain, which means in some cases, the damaged party does not benefit from public intervention at all. This is where private antitrust enforcement becomes relevant, with its primary goals, namely compensation and deterrence29. The realisation of these two goals is still the 28 See for example D.-E. Kahn, Ch.-K. P. Suh, (in:) European Union …, pp. 489 et seq.; P. Freeman, Better to travel hopefully than to arrive? The Reform of UK Competition Law 1991-2016, Regulatory Policy Institute 25th Anniversary Conference, Merton College Oxford 12th/13th September 2016 (retrieved from: http://www. catribunal.org.uk/files/The%20Reform%20of%20UK%20Competition%20 Law%201991-2016.pdf ); E. T. Sullivan, H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust law, policy and procedure: cases, materials, problems, Lexis Nexis 2003 and in the US, the UK and the EU comparative study C. A. Jones, Private Enforcement …, pp. 3-112. 29 See the discussion of the relation between these two main goals of private antitrust enforcement e.g. C. A. Jones, Private Enforcement …, pp. 19 and 80-81; D.A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, Vand. L. Rev. 63, no. 2/2010;W. P. J.Wils, Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe? World Competition, Volume 26, Issue 3, September 2003, pp. 473-488; R. H. Lande, J. P. Davis, Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, University of San Francisco Law Research Paper, No. 2010-07; R. H. Lande, Five Myths About Antitrust Damages, University of San Francisco Law Review, 2006, Vol. 40, p. 6 and R. H. Lande, Why Antitrust Damage Levels Should Be Raised, Loyola Consumer Law Review, 2004, Vol. 16, No. 4, p. 344.
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