Competition Law in Tourism

26 COMPETITION LAW IN TOURISM Abstract The application of the European Union competition law in the tourism sector is a vast subject, comprising several regulated and non-regulated markets, all in constant evolution. The rules on the anticompetitive agreements, the abuse of the dominant position, the control of concentrations and state aid do not single out tourism. General trends, underpinning competition policy affect this fastgrowing sector as well. During the next five years, considerations of the block’s global competitiveness, challenges of digitalisation and increased focus on sustainability will likely dominate the competition discourse. The role of regulation, pertinent to both online and offline tourism services, is also likely to grow. While COVID-19 has disrupted the sector, competition law will continue to apply with only a few modifications in legal standards and policy priorities. Keywords: European Union; Competition Law; Competition Policy; Tourism; Antitrust; Mergers; State Aid; Digitalisation; Online Travel Agents; Parity Clauses; Competitiveness; Sustainability. 1. INTRODUCTION Tourism has been and will remain a heavy-weight of the European Union (EU) economy, comprising multiple sub-sectors, all subject to the application of the EU competition legislation. For decades, the rules on the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements, the abuse of dominant position, the control of concentrations and state aid have been applied without hindrance in tourism markets. Recently, disruptive innovation has created waves across the block and affected both: the competition policy and the tourism industry. Even more recently, the Coronavirus has dealt an unprecedented and unexpectedly heavy blow to the industry. The authors remain confident that by the time these lines are published, this challenge will be overcome. While it will take the sector time to recover, the economic difficulties will not lead to a relaxation of antitrust standards, all the more as the services provided, unlike certain health products, cannot be considered “essential” to respond to the health crisis. Certain mergers will pass with the help of the “failing firm defence”, and the availability of State aid will depend on the generosity of the Member State. As to antitrust, history shows that a crisis leads to crisis cartels. They may be cartels “out of need, not greed”, but they remain cartels. Fines will be high.

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