Wine Law

48 WINE LAW To put it differently, it seems patent that the names attached to the designation of origin are a different type of distinctive sign and, therefore, may be granted an intellectual property right for the benefit of whoever is concerned. This approach is reflected by norms and regulations at all levels – international, Europe-wide or national – with various degrees of mastery, as they project the intellectual right onto the protected name, as they should, or onto the legal status. It can be claimed that, in some sense, these names are more of a distinctive sign in their own right than the best-known trademarks, as both serve the purpose of defining a product and differentiating it from similar ones. However, while trademarks limit themselves to protecting a creative sign, freely chosen by the company owner who intends it to be a symbol of the product, designations of origin protect the name and, in doing so, afford a guarantee of quality, related or inherent to them and which will effectively materialise through a public body’s intervention. The undeniable dissimilarities between both types further clarify their definition while affording “a public streak”, but not necessarily distorting the qualification of the geographical names protected under intellectual property law. Arguably, viewing the geographical name, primarily and commercially, as a distinctive sign has led many to regard safeguarding against forgery as the designation of origin’s primary function or role. In other words, it has been perceived as instrumental in fostering fair competition. It would seem consistent that those who support the role’s relevance would also insist on the essential private-law nature of geographical designations. In order to illustrate the publiclaw character of that legal entity, some questions can be asked, followed by the respective answers: 1) Having conceded above that there are a multiplicity of vested interests lurking about designations of origin, what should be the most significant roles that would justify such a high-stake exception to the unbridled prevailing free-market policies? – It is imperative to bring up here the following pronouncement by the Constitutional Court back in 1990: this legal status “arises out of communal necessity on behalf of the public interest”. 2) Along the same lines, why does the state seek to stimulate designations of origin through a peculiar meddling initiative? – Because it identifies in them strong public interests. 3) Whose remit is it to process applications and the subsequent recognition of the various levels of protection within the system, including the description of the limits defined in the designation? – Subject to a discussion of whether the recognition procedure of the designation should be viewed as an executive or

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