PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN THE TOURISM INDUSTRY 93 compensation is growing, and this trend does not seem likely to change in years to come9. Antitrust law is also present in other parts of the globe. However, its development differs between particular states depending on their legislation and legal culture. Moreover, in many cases, the development of antitrust law depends on the size of the country’s economy. That happens because, for obvious reasons, antitrust law, market and economy are inextricably intertwined. Nonetheless, antitrust law exists in countries like India, China, Australia or Israel, as well as in many others, where there are both significant economic power and potential for tourism10. Similarly, actions that fall under the scope of private antitrust enforcement are the consequences of antitrust law infringement, even though in some countries these actions do not play a substantial role. This study aims to provide an overview on private antitrust enforcement and its relevance to the tourism industry. After a short presentation of the main principles of antitrust law, primarily focused on the US, the EU and its member states’ regulations in the context of the tourism industry (chapter two), this paper focuses on potential private antitrust damages claims based on the infringement of antitrust law (chapter three) as well as other consequences of such infringement (chapter four). The tourism industry, the nature of the infringement, quantification of harm, causation and other characteristics substantial for private antitrust enforcement have all been considered and briefly discussed. The last chapter includes a summary and recommendations (chapter five). In the previous chapter, the author attempts to explain why private enforcement of antitrust law within the tourism industry matters, based on observations and arguments included in previous sections. This chapter contains some basic recommendations on how businesses operating in the tourism industry should handle competition law-related issues in order to avoid adverse consequences of the infringement, in particular, those arising out of potential private antitrust actions. 9 See more about the transposition of the Directive e.g. A. Piszcz (ed.), Implementation of the EU Damages Directive in Central and Eastern European Countries, Warsaw 2017; B. Rodger, M. S. Ferro, F. Marcos, The Antitrust Damages Directive: Facilitating Private Damages Actions in the EU? Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 2019 and also D. Wolski, Can an Ideal Court Model in Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Established? Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 2018, 11(18), pp. 115-152. 10 See e.g. R. Singh, Antitrust Law in India: A Primer for Foreign Companies, India Briefing, March 13, 2018 (https://www.india-briefing.com/news/anti-trust-law-india-primer-foreign-companies-16332.html/); The US-China Business Council, Competition Policy and Enforcement in China, September 2014 (https://www.uschina.org/sites/ default/files/AML%202014%20Report%20FINAL_0.pdf ) or P. Whelan, Competition Law and Criminal Justice (https://www.cars.wz.uw.edu.pl/tresc/news/Paper_Dr_Peter_Whelan.pdf ).
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