TOURISM AND COMPETITION 621 contents. The so-called “Backstop Agreement”: if a GDS received a preferential treatment, it extended those benefits to the other GDSs; besides, there was the “Contractual Restraint”, consisting in pressuring airlines under “take it or leave it” terms and forbidding them from offering differentiated contents or lower prices through other distribution channels. Therefore, due to these facts: a) Airlines are prevented from transferring to consumers (plaintiffs) the savings generated by the use of more economic distribution channels. b) Consumers that do not use the GDS system must nevertheless pay a price that includes the GDS fee. c) Under these conditions of market power, the GDSs coordinated to artificially inflate their prices. d) In order to keep their position of power, they manipulated travel agents by offering incentives for each reservation carried out through the GDSs. Finally, Travelport reached a transaction under the following terms: a) It did not involve economic compromises with the plaintiffs. b) It involved certain modifications in contractual terms and the discontinuation of certain practices. Currently, the suit is still under way against Amadeus and Sabre. IV. CONCLUSIONS We may assert that all distributions intend to make the product available, while economic concentration factors may involve certain risks regarding a reduction in the number of participants. Notwithstanding, concentrations are necessary, yet they must be controlled by rules on competition to prevent distortions that may be detrimental to the final consumer. Concentration is a necessity, partnerships and fusions are examples of this, as tools like Big data allow hotels, OTAs and airlines to begin to implement systems like the NDC with higher levels of concentration, providing a greater knowledge of the client, its strengths and threats. One of the main risks is that airlines may turn into retailers, causing thereof a displacement of tour operators.
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