484 COMPETITION LAW IN TOURISM clause, also known as the most favoured nation clause8; in this context, online travel agencies are also included9. The aim of this paper is to present a broad overview of national and worldwide efforts to combat online platform abuse of market power, especially in relation to online travel agencies. The efforts of the European Union will be presented first, followed by the different national developments of the European countries. 1. EUROPEAN UNION The European Union began paying attention to the online platforms parity clause in 2015. Using the 2010 National Competition Authorities investigations as reference10 the first one of note is the Communication on a digital single market strategy for Europe11. In this reference, it is mentioned that “the market power of some online platforms potentially raises concerns, particularly in relation to the most powerful platforms whose importance for other market participants is becoming increasingly critical”12. Moreover, this document also indicated the possible necessity of regulatory standards related to platforms and intermediaries to reinforce the importance of analysing the role of online platforms13. OnMay 2016, two studies were published.The first onewas aCommunication on online platforms and the digital single market: opportunities and challenges for Europe14. This document indicated the increasing importance of online platforms in the digital economy, describing its ability to challenge the traditional economy. It also indicated some first steps towards a regulatory framework in online platforms. The second linked study is a work document by the Commission staff on the online platform market15, which presented a large framework of online 8 JOZWIAK-GORNY, Sonia, & JOZWIAK, Magdalena. E-commerce and EU competition law. In LODDER, Arno R., & MURRAY, Andrew D. (org.). EU Regulation of e-commerce: a commentary. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017, pp. 335-338. 9 EZRACHI, Ariel, & STUCKE, Maurice E. Virtual competition: the promise and perils of the algorithm-driven economy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016, pp. 139-140. 10 BUEHLER, B. et al. Recent developments at DG Competition: 2016/2017. Review of Industrial Organization, v. 51, no. 4, 2017, pp. 420-421. 11 COM(2015) 192 final. 12 COM(2015) 192 final, p. 9. 13 COM(2015) 192 final, points 3.3 and 3.3.1. 14 COM(2016) 288 final. 15 SWD(2016) 172 final.
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