48 COMPETITION LAW IN TOURISM be material, MSS markets remain attractive for potential and expanding players”141. In sum, in MSS/OTA markets, the Commission has not yet denied clearance because of horizontal objections. It is mostly because the different actors’ market shares were generally low to moderate and/or the parties’ operations were geographically complementary. In any case, there would still be constraining competitive pressure on the merged entity142. However, since mergers in the digital world are dataintensive and actors operating in two- or multisided markets are often data-dependent143, they should pay particular attention to possible adaptations of legal tests for data-intensive concentrations as well as the EU’s data protection legislation. 4.2. Non-horizontal concentrations In the case of non-horizontal (i.e. vertical and conglomerate) concentrations, the most significant non-coordinated effects relate to anticompetitive foreclosure144. Conversely, coordinated effects arise where the concentration changes the nature of competition in such a way that firms that previously were not coordinating their behaviour are now significantly more likely to coordinate to raise prices or otherwise harmeffectivecompetition.Fosteringpre-existingcoordinationisalsoproblematic145. In the tourism industry, actors are often vertically integrated or belong to large conglomerate groups, having interests in different sectors. For example, tour operators may have integrated airline seats or other upstream services such as destination management services, making them wholesalers of travel services. Downstream, they could have integrated package holidays and provision of travel agency services. Moves towards integration are often non-problematic146, however, sometimes competition risks do arise. 141 Ibid. para.109. 142 Case M.9005 – Booking Holdings / Hotelscombined, para. 121. 143 Mira Burri, Understanding the Implications of Big Data and Big Data Analytics for Competition Law: An attempt for a Primer, in K. MATHIS and A. TOR (eds.), New developments in Competition Law and Economics, Springer, 2019, p. 249. 144 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, (2008/C 265/07), 18.10.2008 (hereinafter: “Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines”), para. 18. 145 Ibid. para. 19. 146 See, e.g. acquisition of Italian Tour operator Alpitur by Italian holding Ifil, active in various areas, such as automotive, banking, retail, internet services and tourism. (EC IP/00/1000 of 13 September 2000, https://europa. eu/rapid/press-release_IP-00-1000_en.htm); See also: A. PAPATHEODOROU, “Exploring Competition Issues in Tourism”, Conference Paper, January 2003, p. 9, available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286232341_ Exploring_Competition_Issues_in_Tourism.
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