THE PROPOSED INTRODUCTION OF MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS 319 We also believe that a system of ex post investigation is better than exante controls: it would allow an assessment of the benefits (or detriments) of a particular airline (or group of airlines) holding a significant share of slots; it would be less time consuming and help to avoid the delay introduced on slot trading; and it could also have the flexibility to address all of the potential issues that arise. Finally, the ability to investigate ex post may well have some exante deterrent effect against anticompetitive conducts. 5. CONCLUSIONS Based on the analysis within this chapter, we can conclude the following: A) One of the most important obstacles to competition is the lack of airport capacity at congested airports in Europe; B) Slot allocation and slot trading have a direct effect on player competition; C) Slots should be treated as contractual rights; D) There are many possible competition concerns surrounding slot trading; E) Secondary trading increases the opportunity cost of slot hoarding, so it’s not clear whether it would make the problem better or worse; F) Slot trading is not the only and final solution to increasing efficiency at congested airports; G) The design of the slot trading mechanisms should balance trading with competition, avoiding misuse; H) Auctioning slots to the highest bidder should not be considered as a possible solution, as it increases costs and uncertainty to the slot trading mechanism; I) A system of ex post investigation is better than the ex-ante control. REFERENCES [1] BOE, Valentijn de (2005), Allocation of Slots to Airlines: What Role for Competition Law?, Journal of Network Industries, pp. 293-332. [2] BALFOUR, John (2004), EC competition law and airline alliances, Journal of Air Transport Management, pp. 81-85. [3] Enforcement of EU competition policy – Information on a forthcoming audit (2018). [4] GREMMINGER, Michael (2006), Commercial Slot Allocation – A Competition policy perspective.
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