316 COMPETITION LAW IN TOURISM Proposal Pros Cons (1.4) Requiring post- -trade publication of prices • Would still facilitate a non- -discrimination policy • Could be ‘averaged’ or otherwise disguised to reduce sensitivity of information • This may also boost the volume of trade by highlighting the opportunity cost • Due to heterogeneity of slots, it may not be possible in practice to average information and still provide a meaningful indication of prices (1.5) Requiring sale to highest bidder • This would facilitate non- -discrimination if trading is anonymous (otherwise the seller could always refuse to sell at all if the buyer is, for example, its main potential rival) • Prevents trades “in-kind” such as those that have occurred within London and reduces flexibility of trades • This may reduce the volume of trades • Does not address, and may in fact encourage, slot hoarding given hub carriers may have the highest valuation of slots (1.6) Anonymous bidding • Would help ensure non- -discrimination • In practice it may be easy to determine who is buying or selling slots (1.7) Requiring non- -discrimination short of sale to highest bidder • Would help ensure non- -discrimination • It is not clear how practical this option is and its effectiveness would depend on the vigour of the regulatory body
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