234 COMPETITION LAW IN TOURISM of freedom of others, morality or public order, the intervention of the State is justified to harmonize the conflict of interests that is generated: “XVII – Of course, the fundamental rights and freedoms are subject to certain restrictions, the necessary ones, but nothing more than those necessary to the validity of the democratic and constitutional values. However, for a restriction to be “necessary” it is not enough that it be “useful”, “reasonable” or “timely”, but it must imply the “existence of an imperious social need” that supports the restriction. Therefore, for freedom restrictions to be constitutionally and internationally lawful, “they must be oriented to satisfy an imperative public interest”. Amongst several options to achieve that objective, the one that less restricts the protected right must be chosen... the restriction – on the other hand – must be proportionate to the interest that justifies it and closely adjusted to the achievement of that legitimate objective, which implies, on the one hand, that the restriction must be socially imperious and, therefore, exceptional, as such, of restrictive interpretation, so that in case of doubt, freedom should always be preferred, on the other, that the same interpretation of the “common good” must be made in the context of the constitutional order as a whole, in accordance with its system of fundamental values – in Costa Rica, in short, those of democracy, the rule of law, the essential dignity of the human being and the “system of freedom” – (...) XIX (…) the concepts of morality, public order or the necessary protection of the rights of third parties, as indeterminate, authorize a certain flexibility, but do not imply in any case arbitrariness and which is subject, as is the same discretion, to jurisdictional control; control that, as jurisprudence and doctrine have invariably recognized, must be exercised according to criteria of rationality and reasonableness; flexibility, or discretion, then, which in no case may imply arbitrariness. (...) Likewise, the legitimacy of the restrictions on fundamental rights is ordered to a series of principles that this Court has previously indicated -Vote 3550-92, for example: 1.- they must be called to satisfy an imperative public interest; 2.- to achieve this public interest, one must choose between several options the one that less restricts the protected right; 3.- the restriction must be proportionate to the interest that justifies it and strictly adjust to the achievement of that objective; 4.- The restriction must be socially urgent, and therefore exceptional” (Vote 2002-05503, 5 June 2002). This way, it is clear that freedom of trade can be limited and regulated by the State based on a harmonious interpretation of articles 28 and 46 of the Political
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