192 COMPETITION LAW IN TOURISM entering into a fierce competition will increase the risks of having retaliation on other markets: “Fear of retaliation was amongst the commonly referred to barriers to entry. Several respondents indicated that they would expect an aggressive reaction by Ryanair in terms of pricing and marketing. According to Aer Lingus ‘Ryanair has an established reputation for aggressive retaliation to entry’. Similarly, Vueling believes that Ryanair and Aer Lingus will commercially react with all the tools available to them to prevent any new additional airline at Dublin. It finds it very difficult to compete with Ryanair when Ryanair has a strong position in a market and it considers Ryanair to be a very aggressive competitor. Aer Arann indicates that ‘The primary barrier to route expansion by Aer Arann at Dublin airport is the potential competitive reaction from Ryanair’. In the same way, Air Berlin would expect very aggressive pricing. According to easyJet, ‘Ryanair is an aggressive competitor as has been shown by its reactions to other airlines trying to enter that market. Thanks to its financial strength, its low cost model and its size it can easily enter into long- -lasting price wars and push competitors out of the market”47. The UE Commission eventually stated that all potential competitors would not consider entering in fierce competition with the Ryanair and Aer Lingus on any of the overlap routes: “The investigation showed that, as a result of these barriers, entry is not likely, but even unlikely on almost all overlap routes. In the absence of potential entrants on the vast majority of overlap routes and given that competitors have unanimously indicated that they would not even consider entering in direct competition with the merged entity on a significant scale (in particular by opening a base at Dublin), the Commission concludes that entry is not likely, timely and sufficient to constitute a sufficient competitive constraint on the merged entity and defeat the likely anti-competitive effects of the proposed merger”48. 47 Ryanair/Aer Lingus III (2013), paras 725 to 727. 48 Ryanair/Aer Lingus I (2007), para 784.
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