IS THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY A NATURAL MONOPOLY 177 1.3. The Control of Concentrations in the Airline Industry The assessment of decisions of the EU Commission12 and EU case-law can give a specific insight on how economic theories and models can be apprehended ex-ante by the enforcement of EU antitrust law. Since the 2004 merger Regulation, the EU Commission has examined several mergers and alliances between airlines. Most of the time, the EU Commission cleared the deals. The consolidation process of the three main European FSCs groups (Lufthansa, IAG and Air France/KLM) was reviewed by the EU Commission in the key decisions: IAG/BMI (2012), British Airways/Iberia (2010), Lufthansa/ Austrian (2009), Lufthansa/SN Brussels (2009), Lufthansa/Swiss (2005), Air France/KLM (2004), British Airways/SN Brussels (2003) and Lufthansa/Austrian (2002). The assessment cases, including LCCs, have followed in the decisions: Ryanair/Laudamotion (2018), IAG/Aer Lingus (2016), Aegean/Olympic II (2013), Ryanair/Aer Lingus III (2013), Aegean/Olympic (2011), Iberia/Vueling/Clickair (2009), Ryanair/Aer Lingus (2007) and Lufthansa/Eurowings (2005). Extra-EU international alliances and joint ventures have been reviewed through the EU merger regulation in: US Airways/American Airlines (2018), Qatar Airways/ Alisarda/Meridiana (2017), Alitalia/Etihad (2014), Delta Airlines/Virgin Group/ Virgin Atlantic Limited (2013), Delta/Northwest (2008), United/Continental (2010), BA/AA/Iberia (2010), Air France/Alitalia (2004) and KLM/Alitalia (1999). Only three cases were prohibited mergers: both attempts by Ryanair to acquire Aer Lingus were blocked in Ryanair/Aer Lingus (2007) and Ryanair/Aer Lingus III (2013), and the other prohibition decision was about the proposed acquisition by Aegean Airlines of Olympic Air in Olympic/Aegean (2011). However, in Aegean/Olympic II (2013), the EU Commission cleared, for the first time, a concentration it had rejected a few years before and the reason was that Olympic Air was on the edge of financial failure and, taking into consideration the almost certain removal of Olympic from the market, the merger would not have caused additional competitive harm. Most of the other deals were cleared with remedies. The EU General Court13 reviewed two decisions. The Ryanair/Aer Lingus (2007) decision was confirmed in 2010 as the Court dismissed the appeal 12 See infra for the reference of the main EU Commission decisions. 13 EGC: constituent court of the Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU), prior to the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, it was known as the Court of First Instance (CFI).
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